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ABSTRACT          2 
 
In 2003 the University of Cape Town introduced an anonymous examination policy. 
This paper reports on a study of the impact of the implementation of this policy on 
student performance. Comparisons of student results pre- and post policy 
implementation showed no evidence of negative or positive discrimination of students 
in the examination marking.  Interviews with course conveners suggested however, 
that, irrespective of the policy, markers infer student identity from examinations and 
that these inferences can influence their assessment. The most commonly cited 
example was ‘sympathetic marking’, that is, assessors marking more generously if 
they infer a student to be educationally under-prepared. The paper concludes that the 
implementation of this policy has had a limited impact on strengthening the validity 
of assessment results, but is likely to be retained given both staff and students’ 





Anonymous marking of examinations, that is, concealing the name of the student 
from the marker, has become standard good practice in many universities around the 
world.  At the University of Cape Town (UCT) calls for anonymous examination 
came from  students in the early 1990’s – a politically turbulent time in South Africa’s 
history -- who argued that anonymous marking would minimize the possibility of 
“passive discrimination” or “unconscious (gender and racial) bias” in the final written 
examinations1. Responses from the academic community to this policy proposal 
ranged from general support to strong opposition. In 2003 after more than a decade of 
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The policy claims that anonymous marking will strengthen the validity of UCT’s 
assessment in two ways2. Firstly, anonymous marking minimizes the possibility of 
subconscious3 irrelevant inferencing which may discriminate for or against students, 
in particular inferences based on gender, race and any other kind of information that 
can be made on the basis of a student’s name.  Secondly, anonymous marking 
strengthens UCT’s assessment system by addressing students’ perceptions that the 
marking could be biased. Even where discrimination cannot be conclusively 
confirmed, it is important that students perceive the assessment to be free of bias.  
 
While gaining Senate approval for this policy was challenging, what proved to be 
almost as difficult was reaching consensus on a system of implementation. The 
system finally adopted, after much discussion, was to conceal the students’ name and 
student number under a sealed corner flap. For practical administrative purposes, 
some form of identification was needed on the front cover of the script. It was argued 
that until such time as UCT was able to implement an alternative identification system 
(e.g. use of bar codes), the student number must be written on the front cover of the 
script.   The student number at UCT is an alpha-numeric code consisting of the first 
three consonants of the surname, followed by the first three letters of the first name, 
followed by a three-digit number. Objectors argued that this method of 
implementation only ensured partial anonymity since it is possible from the student 
number to infer some aspects of identity, for example, a student number MJLXOL001 
is likely to be that of an African student given the consonant combinations and the 
first name beginning with ‘X’ which are commonly found in Xhosa names. Despite 
these objections, the use of the student number was accepted as the most 
administratively efficient mechanism until a new student identification system was 
available. 
 
Given the sensitivities around this policy, the Examinations and Assessment 
Committee of Senate called for an impact study into whether the policy had indeed 
                                                 
2 The first author was responsible for drafting the policy on behalf of UCT’s Examinations and 
Assessment sub-committee of Senate.  
3 The policy acknowledges that anonymous marking only addresses subconscious discrimination. No 







strengthened the validity of UCT’s examination assessment system in the two years of 




Educational and psychological assessment scholars have come to understand validity 
as the adequacy and appropriateness of the inferences from assessment and the 
decisions and consequences which emerge from these inferences (Messick 1989).  
Putting the emphasis of validity on the inferences (rather than the assessment 
instruments or scores) highlights assessment as an interpretive process which is 
“social as much as rational” (Cronbach 1989). Messick (1989) and Cronbach (1989) 
argue that there are no value-free inferences. The challenge lies in the rigour of the 
practices and processes which support the assessment interpretations, ensuring 
inferences that are relevant to the knowledge, skills and attitudes being assessed. 
 
The influence of irrelevant inferences, or bias, on the assessment of student 
performance is a long-standing concern and subject of research in the field of 
educational assessment. More recently quality assurance imperatives in higher 
education have cast a spotlight on the validity of assessment systems and in particular 
the reliability of examination results – a crucial issue since the whole edifice of 
quality education rests on the overall validity of the assessment system (Knight 2002). 
Concerns about reliability include, among others, the appropriateness of examination 
assessment methods, the prevalence of cheating, and the reliability of marking. 
Numerous studies have documented the problem of consistency between markers 
particularly at the higher levels of the education system where tasks become more 
complex and open to interpretation (Newstead and Dennis 1994, Scharaschkin and 
Baird 1999, Shay 2004, 2005, Spear 1997). Inconsistencies that emerge are often 
attributed to assessor bias and there is an extensive body of research in educational 
assessment on the influence of bias on test design, administration and assessment 
(Fleming 1999, Gipps and Murphy 1994, Greatorex and Bell 2004).  
 
While the practice of anonymous examination marking is fairly prevalent in higher 
education, there are few studies on the impact of these policies. Two studies 





that the introduction of ‘blind’ marking resulted in the improved performance of 
women.   Another study, however, where gender and ethnic bias were investigated 
found no evidence of discrimination (Dorsey and Colliver 1995).  Newstead and 
Dennis (1993) question whether studies such as those conducted by Belsey and 
Bradley can provide conclusive answers regarding the existence of sex or gender bias 
in marking. They conclude that in the area of gender bias it has been very difficult to 
disentangle effects of bias from true differences in performance and that it is 
necessary to broaden the types of bias investigated to include things such as effects of 
social class, race and prior knowledge of the student.  
 
Two more recent studies conducted on the assessment of clinical skills, although not 
directly studies of anonymous marking, are relevant in the South African context 
where race, social class and educational performance are intertwined. McManus et al 
(1996) in the UK investigated the claim that much higher failure rates of minority 
medical students in clinical examinations was evidence of bias.  She found that while 
UK ethnic minority students tended to perform less well in clinical exams than UK 
white students, they also tended to perform less well in all examinations, including 
MCQ’s marked by machines. She concluded that disparities in marking could not be 
accounted for by racial discrimination.  Wass et al (2003) conducted a quantitative 
and qualitative study investigating the effect of ethnicity on performance in clinical 
examinations. Like McManus et al, their study concluded that disparities in 
performance could not be accounted for by explicit racial bias. Their study suggests 
that the poorer performance of ethnic students may be due to these students’ particular 
‘styles of communication’ with the patients being examined, being deemed as 
inappropriate by the assessors (what Gee 1996 would call ‘discourse’ differences).   
 
These studies all point to the difficulty of disentangling a variety of issues which 
impact on students’ performance, as well as the range of construct-relevant and 
construct-irrelevant inferences which influence markers’ assessment.  
 
The premise of this study is that the assessment of complex tasks, is a socially 
situated, interpretive act (Shay 2004), and that all judgments of student performance 
(irrespective of who the markers are) involve a tangled complexity of inferences, 
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historical period and institutional context more or less heated contestation about 
which is which.  The aim of this research is to explore, on the basis of student results, 
whether there are any shifts in the patterns of student performance in examinations 
which might be attributed to the implementation of the anonymous examination 
policy and to explore through interviews the course conveners’ interpretations and 
explanations for these patterns4.   
 
Thus, the study set out to answer the following questions: 
1) Are there any significant differences in the patterns of student performance in 
examinations prior to and following the implementation of the anonymous 
examination policy?  
2) What do markers perceive to be the major reasons for these differences (or lack of 
differences)?  
 
The study  
 
The study was conducted on a sample of five undergraduate courses, one from each of   
UCT’s six faculty, with the exception of the Law Faculty where anonymous marking 
has been in place for many years. The courses were selected on the basis of the 
following criteria:  
• Curriculum stability -- Courses with relative stability over the period  under 
investigation with respect to course content, staff, student intake, assessment 
system in order to control for the number of variables contributing to possible 
changes in student performance;  
• Size  -- Courses with large student numbers (>200 students) where anonymity 
is more likely to be achieved;   
• Diversity of students -- Courses with diverse student body in terms of 
population group, educational background, language since students’ concerns 
about racial discrimination were central to the study.  
 
                                                 
4 It was the intention of this study to include students’ interpretations of the performance patterns. 
While students are represented on various fora where this study has been presented, it has not been 







• Varied assessment items -- Courses where the examination included high 
inference items (e.g. essays), low inference items (e.g. short answer questions 
or mathematical problems) and no-inference items (e.g. computer-marked 
multiple choice questions).  This would enable us to better isolate changes in 
performance patterns which could be attributed to the policy vs. other 
contributing variables. For example, changes in performance on computer-
marked items could not be attributed to the anonymity policy.  
 
In two of the faculties -- Engineering and Science -- it was not possible to find courses 
with sufficiently large student numbers that met the stability criterion, therefore 
courses with fewer students were selected. Only Humanities had a course which had 
both high and no-inference items, which also met the other criteria.  
 
Both quantitative and qualitative data were collected. The quantitative data comprised 
mean course marks, mean examination marks and mark distributions for two years 
prior to the implementation of the policy (2002-2003) and two years following 
implementation (2004-2005)5.  The data were analyzed for the overall student cohort 
for each course, and disaggregated by gender, population group6, language7 and 
educational background8. In the Humanities course the data were also disaggregated 
by high and no-inference items. Analyses of the quantitative data were then discussed 
in interviews with each of the course conveners. The course conveners were all 
                                                 
5 Examination results were only available from 2003-2005 for the Health Science course and the 
anonymous examination policy was only implemented in 2005 in the Engineering course.  
 
6 Population group in the South African context refers to the ‘race’ classifications used under apartheid: 
Black (meaning African), Coloured, Indian and White. These classifications are still required in South 
Africa for the purposes of monitoring equity.  
 
7 Language refers to home or first language. For the purposes of this research students were classified 
as English or ‘other’ since the interest was whether students were English first language or English as 
an additional language.  
 
8 Educational background refers to the type of school from which the student matriculated. Although 
South African national education has been housed under one department since 1994, the legacy of 
apartheid education continues to result in uneven quality of education to this day. Students are 
classified as coming from  four groups of schools: House of Assembly (HOA) which refers to schools 
which were located within the historically White schooling system;  House of Representatives (HOR) 
which refers to schools from the historically  Indian schooling system; Department of Education and 
Culture (DEC) which refers to schools which were located within the historically Coloured schooling 
system,  and Department of Education and Training (DET) which refers to schools from the historically 






relatively experienced academics (> 5 years in academe). Four were males and all 
were white. This latter information is relevant given the primary concern about racial 
and gender discrimination which initiated the policy.  
 
 
Findings & Discussion 
 
Findings: Student Performance  
 
Given the history of racial discrimination in South Africa and the students’ particular 
concerns about the potential for such discrimination in examination marking, the 
primary interest of the study was to establish whether there was any evidence of 
negative discrimination prior to the implementation of the policy on the basis of 
population group, language, educational background and gender. We speculate that, if 
there had been significant levels of discrimination on these grounds, and if the 
implementation of  the policy succeeded in masking these aspects of student identity, 
then, as was the case in the Belsey (1988) study, the findings should reveal changed 
performance for certain categories of students (for example, Black African students) 
following the policy implementation.  
 
Before turning to the research questions, it needs to be noted that the legacy of 
apartheid’s discriminatory educational policy continues to persist in racially-
distributed academic performance. Across all five courses there is a consistent pattern 
of differentials in performance across population groups, educational backgrounds 
and language. (There are also gender differentials, with the general trend that women 
outperform males by small margins. See C-4, E-4, H-4, HS-4, S-4)  In other words, 
there is a general pattern that students who are White outperform students who are 
Indian, Coloured and Black (See C-2, E-2, H-2, HS-2, S-2). Students who are first 
language English-speakers outperform speakers of English as an additional language 
(See tables C-1, E-1, H-1, HS-1, S-1); and students from former HoA schools tend to 
outperform students from HOR and DET (See tables C-3, E-3, H-3, HS-3, S-3). There 
is evidence of this pattern in other performance data collected at UCT (Cliff, Yeld and 
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2005). As increasing numbers of black9 students emerge from historically HoA 
schools, there is a perception among academic staff that these patterns are beginning 
to shift. However the data from these courses is evidence of a persistent reality of 
racially differentiated performance where race, educational background and language 
continue to serve as proxies for disadvantage. Against this backdrop the interest of 
this paper is whether there are any significant changes in these performances patterns 
after the policy implementation. We now turn to address this question.  
 
In relation to differences in performances patterns pre- and post- policy 
implementation, there were no significant differences in any of the courses in 
performance patterns disaggregated by population group, education background, 
language and gender, in other words the racially differentiated performance pattern 
described above do not shift post-policy implementation (See C 1-4, E 1-4, H 1-4, HS 
1-4, S 1-4) .  Thus in relation to the students’ concerns which initiated calls for the 
policy, there is no evidence from the performance data of negative discrimination on 
the basis of population group, language, gender or ex-education background. Nor is 
there any evidence of positive discrimination being applied to particular groups of 
students. 
                                                 



























In terms of differences in the performance of the overall cohort pre- and post-policy, 
the data reveals no significant differences in means in two courses (Science and 
Health Science with p-values of 0.03 and 0.003 respectively) (see S-5 and HS-5), nor 
is there any significant difference in distribution of scores for these two courses.  In 
the other three courses (Commerce, Engineering and Humanities) there is a significant 
difference in the mean scores pre and post policy. In Commerce there is a significant 
difference (p<0.0001) between the examination means for each year (2002-2005) with 
a marked significant decrease of 7% between 2003 and 2004, the year of policy 
implementation (see C-5). There is also a shift in the distribution patterns with a wider 
distribution of scores post-policy. In the Engineering course there is a statistically 
significant increase in mean scores for 2002, 2003 and 2004 and a statistically 
significant decrease in 2005 (p<0.0001), the year of policy implementation (see E-5). 
In the Humanities course there is no significant difference between examination 
means for 2002 and 2003 but there is a statistically significant decrease (p<0.0001)  of 
7% between 2003 and 2004, the year of policy implementation(see H-5). The 
examination means disaggregated by item type reveals that this decrease is consistent 
for both the high inference items (i.e. essays) and the no-inference items (i.e. multiple 
choice questions which are computer marked).  
 
Although it is tempting to attribute these decreases in mean average and widening of 
distribution to the policy implementation, the fact that the mean average on the 
Humanities multiple choice items also decreased, and by the same percentage as the 
high inference questions in that examination, suggests that we must be cautious about 
any causal links between the changes in performance patterns and the policy. If the 
implementation of the policy contributed to the decrease in marks in some of the 
courses and the wider distribution in one of the courses, it was only one of multiple 
contributing factors.  
 
    
Findings: Conveners’ Explanations 
 
The student performance data seems to suggest that students’ concerns about 
discrimination in examination marking are unfounded. We felt however that it was  





important to explore other possible interpretations of these performance patterns 
through interviews with the course conveners. Where there were no differences in 
performance post-policy implementation (as in Health Science and Science), where 
there were small decreases (as in Engineering), or where there were significant 
decreases (as in Commerce and Humanities), what explanations did conveners have to 
offer for these patterns? The interviews would also provide an opportunity for 
conveners to offer any other insights on this sensitive issue.  
 
The Health Science course convener’s explanation for no difference in the 
performance patterns was that the course, since its inception in 2001, has always had a 
rigorous internal moderation process in place. She argued that discrimination on the 
basis of irrelevant inferences would be picked up through their own moderation 
process. Thus in relation to their course, the anonymous examination policy was 
redundant.  
 
The Science and Engineering course conveners speculated that the small decrease in 
examination mean,  although statistically significant in the case of the latter course,  
was not particularly significant from their perspective. They both argued that this was 
most likely a result of variation in examination difficulty from one year to the next.  
 
In the Commerce course, the course convener felt strongly that the policy was in part 
responsible for the marked decrease in examination mean as well as the wider 
distribution of marks. His argument was that the policy had minimized positive 
discrimination, or “sympathetic marking”- that is, assessors marking more generously 
if they perceive a student to be educationally “disadvantaged”. This theme of 
“sympathetic marking” came up in all the interviews and we return to it below.  
 
In Humanities, the course convener was deeply puzzled by the decrease and was 
unable to offer any satisfactory explanation. Given that the decrease was evidenced on 
both the essay items as well as the MCQ items, he argued it was not possible to 
attribute the decrease to the policy alone.  He proposed that perhaps the students were 
academically weaker in that year, although to counter this argument he noted that 






In addition to these explanations, further probing revealed a general scepticism from 
all the conveners about attempts to “anonymize” examination marking as well as an 
acknowledgment that, with or without the policy, markers do make inferences about 
student identity and these inferences can influence their judgments.  
 
As noted in the introduction, one of the concerns in the implementation of this policy 
was the use of the student number which encodes aspects of student identity. This 
issue re-emerged as a key theme across all the interviews. The limits of anonymity 
were exemplified in three ways:  Firstly, the Engineering course convenor noted that 
in smaller courses such as his (fewer than 100 students), where academic staff often 
teach and assess their own students, staff are likely to know students by their student 
numbers. If this is the case, it suggests that at UCT there is no anonymity in 
examination marking in the majority of courses at the upper undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels where numbers are relatively small.  Secondly, in large courses 
where staff are unlikely to know students personally, as noted before, inferences about 
student identity can sometimes be made on the basis of the student number. One 
lecturer noted, “If UCT wants to eliminate any bias from marking, which I think is a 
good thing, they should go to the system they have at X university where… a student 
number is just a number”. Thirdly, irrespective of the student number, staff testified to 
making inferences about identity on the basis of the actual student performance, for 
example, grammar, handwriting, or word usage. One marker noted, “I would be 
willing to bet if you were to give me thirty or forty exams I can pick them (out)…it’s 
not hard, the way they use language. I can say  – he’s Black or he’s Coloured or he is 
Afrikaans or if he’s English. It’s not that I am looking for it…”. What these accounts 
suggest is that with or without the student number assessors consciously or 
unconsciously infer student identity from the examination script.  
 
The question is, do these inferences about identity influence assessor’s judgments? If 
so, how? A couple of interviewees initially dismissed the suggestion that markers are 
influenced by these inferences. With reference to student identity one noted, ‘I don’t 
pay any attention to it…’. Another noted, “It’s just not even possible, not really. 
Anyone faced with a pile of marking doesn’t give a hoot or damn about who the 





across all the interviews was that knowledge about the student does influence 
assessors’ interpretations – whether the assessor has first-hand knowledge about the 
student or is inferring this on the basis of the student number or script.   
 
For example, one convenor noted the prevalence of the ‘halo effect’, that is, students 
who “catch your eye…whom you come to like because they are visible”. He noted, 
“all the research in education shows that once you’ve got that you can do no wrong, 
your marks are going to be better because people expect you to be better”. However 
the most common example of how inferences about student identity influence the 
assessment was the case of ‘sympathetic marking’. These are instances where a name, 
a student number or the actual performance evokes in the marker a stereotype of a 
‘disadvantaged’ student which may generate sympathy on the part of the marker, 
particularly if the student’s performance is on the pass/fail borderline. One convener 
admitted, “You note the name and think the language isn’t going to be good. And 
with that you’d have an element of, you know, how would I do in a second 
language?... Here’s somebody carrying two bags of cement on their shoulders, not 
one…And so you go a bit easy….If it’s obvious to me that a student is not a first 
language English speaker and there’s really something I’m struggling to understand, I 
would tend to give them the benefit of the doubt. I would sort of say to myself, ‘Could 
he mean that?’”   
 
As noted above, one of the course conveners initially argued for a causal relationship 
between the policy and the decreased performance. His explanation for the decreased 
marks was that the policy had minimized sympathetic marking. He argued that since 
the implementation of the policy markers could now assess on the basis of “merit” 
rather than accounting for extenuating circumstances – “a poor answer now gets a low 
mark”.  He describes the reasoning as follows:  “If you know the race of the student 
and…you make an assumption about the quality of their schooling that in general (it) 
was better than the majority of black students…one can almost say that there’s a 
feeling that it’s their fault. (It’s) the student’s fault if they haven’t answered the 
question well, because they haven’t worked hard enough or they haven’t paid 
attention or whatever it might be. Whereas if you find that with a student that you 
know is a black student, it’s not that easy to make that judgment. You think well, they 





would give them the benefit of the doubt.” By contrast the new policy “liberated” 
markers. “I don’t need to care any more…and it’s easier to mark…there’s no 
agonising, there used to be agonising. We are in an agonising-free zone now.” 
Although the failure rate was notably higher, he argued that since the policy 
implementation the examination results were a “fair assessment of the actual stuff 
before us”. On the other hand, “if we think fairness requires preferential treatment, 
then it’s not fair…on my version of fairness, it’s more fair in 2004 (post-policy) 
because I don’t think it’s the university’s job to redress the social norms.” 
 
Thus while the student performance data suggests no positive or negative 
discrimination of particular groups of students, the interviews point to another reality 
– that of white academics caught between a university’s contending discourses of 
equity and excellence, of redress and success. Not surprisingly, despite the 
administrative burden of implementing the policy, and despite their skepticism about 
its ability to ensure anonymity, the policy is welcomed. They all agreed that if the 
intention of the policy is to separate the person (the student) from the product (the 
performance), in the current political climate this is a good thing.  As one convener 
noted, “We should be treating the scripts as objective products as much as possible, 




In summary, on the basis of this sample, comparisons of pre- and post-policy 
examination results indicate no evidence of negative discrimination against students 
on the basis of population group, language, gender or ex-education background. 
While there is a strong perception on the part of one convener that the effect of the 
policy may have been to minimize ‘sympathetic marking’, there is no evidence in the 
performance data to support this. Where there is a significant decrease in examination 
results post-policy as well as a widening in the distribution of scores, these patterns 
are consistent across all groups. To the extent that the anonymity policy has 
contributed to this decrease, it has affected the whole cohort.  We speculate that one 
possible reason for this decrease is that de-coupling ‘person’ from ‘product’ results in 
more conservative marking, at least in the initial stages of implementation. This 
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sceptical about the degree to which UCT’s system ensured anonymity, they noted that 
the policy signalled the importance of assessing examination products on their merit 
without contextual considerations. This move to ‘objectify’ examination marking was 
welcomed.         
 
The intention of the policy was to strengthen the validity of UCT’s examination 
assessment. What conclusions can we make on the basis of this study about the 
impact of this policy?  As previously discussed, validity is the degree to which the 
inferences made about student performance are relevant to the knowledge, skills and 
attitudes being assessed. The intention of the policy is that by removing the students’ 
name, aspects of student identity such as race and gender, which are deemed 
irrelevant, are thereby removed. In South Africa, however, race, language, and 
educational opportunity remain inextricably intertwined with performance for the 
foreseeable future. As all assessors of complex performances know stripping ‘subject’ 
from ‘object’ is very challenging, often not possible or even desirable. This is not an 
argument in support of ‘sympathetic marking’. Attempting to compensate for poor 
schooling by awarding extra points is indefensible. What it does suggest, however, is 
that, while we might retain the anonymous examination policy for political reasons, 
its contribution to strengthening validity is limited. Valid assessment results will 
emerge from rigorous assessment and moderation practices which require the 
community of interpreters – academics, tutors, external examiners – to articulate what 
we really value. Practically, this supports the need for clear marking criteria, model 
answers, marker training, and moderation meetings. These are not to be seen as 
technical or bureaucratic managerial requirements but rather opportunities for 
rigorous collegial debate about the value-basis of our assessment judgements, what is 
relevant and what is not, and under what circumstances.  It would appear that there is 
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Year Student No/ 
Mean Score 
Cohort Lang Pop Group Ex-Education Gender 
Eng O W B I C HoA HoR/DEC DET F M 
2002 N 976 715 257 465 303 89 114 669 22 30 423 549 
M 57 59 54 59 55 59 55 59 55 52 59 56 
2003 N 1035 752 282 436 315 130 152 877 57 78 430 604 
M 62 63 58 64 59 63 60 62 60 54 62 61 
2004 N 958 692 266 405 298 114 132 830 40 62 411 547 
M 55 56 51 58 52 54 51 56 52 46 55 54 
2005 N 872 592 280 328 287 110 124 711 51 71 339 533 
M 51 52 48 53 49 51 49 52 46 43 52 50 
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Year Student No/ 
Mean Score 
Cohort Lang Pop Group Ex-Education Gender 
Eng O W B I C HoA HoR/DEC DET F M 
2002 N 90 46 44 25 49 4 12 47 7 23 18 72 
M 55 62 48 61 50 56 61 61 65 42 52 56 
2003 N 84 34 50 22 55 2 5 43 3 28 18 66 
M 62 64 61 66 60 75 66 62 64 60 63 62 
2004 N 93 47 46 25 52 5 11 57 4 29 30 63 
M 66 69 64 68 66 53 70 66 78 65 72 63 
2005 N 89 51 36 21 49 7 10 63 0 12 20 67 
M 63 64 61 68 60 68 64 64  62 64 63 
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Year Student No/ 
Mean Score 
Cohort Lang Pop Group Ex-Education Gender 
Eng O W B I C HoA HoR/DEC DET F M 
2002 N 712 572 139 408 149 35 119 620 37 24 531 180 
M 64 66 58 67 58 65 60 65 59 53 65 62 
2003 N 651 560 90 416 101 26 106 596 27 18 505 146 
M 63 64 57 65 58 62 60 63 58 52 64 60 
2004 N 574 477 96 352 107 29 79 516 26 15 460 114 
M 55 55 54 57 52 55 51 55 53 47 56 53 
2005 N 628 526 102 353 128 40 104 418 17 7 495 133 
M 59 60 53 63 52 54 55 60 57 37 59 58 
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Year Student No/ 
Mean Score 
Cohort Lang Pop Group Ex-Education Gender 
Eng O W B I C HoA HoR/DEC DET F M 
2003 N 335 253 80 154 77 42 60 284 26 18 255 78 
M 66 67 64 68 64 67 64 66 64 62 67 64 
2004 N 351 239 112 152 111 34 51 286 17 38 260 91 
M 65 67 61 67 62 66 64 66 62 61 66 63 
2005 N 345 265 80 152 84 40 63 286 20 29 250 95 
M 65 66 62 66 62 65 65 65 64 61 65 63 
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Year Student No/ 
Mean Score 
Cohort Lang Pop Group Ex-Education Gender 
Eng O W B I C HoA HoR/DEC DET F M 
2002 N 195 146 40 122 34 11 18 171 9 12 89 97 
M 48 51 40 54 36 42 42 49 45 32 50 48 
2003 N 203 158 43 116 43 9 32 171 15 14 115 86 
M 50 51 46 53 43 40 49 51 46 41 48 51 
2004 N 210 161 45 131 42 9 23 183 10 13 103 104 
M 49 51 45 54 41 47 42 50 45 41 49 49 
2005 N 180 130 49 92 57 11 17 131 4 18 92 87 
M 46 47 41 49 40 46 44 47 39 39 48 43 
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COMPARISON OF MEANS FOR OVERALL COHORT  
 
C-5 COMMERCE 
COM: Comparison of exam means and course 








cohort 57 62 55 51
C-mark 59 61 61 58













cohort 55 62 66 63

































exam 64 63 55 59
MCQ 71 72 65 64
essay 61 59 50 56






HS- HEALTH SCIENCE 


























cohort 48 50 49 46
2002 2003 2004 2005
 
p<0.03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
